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REFLECTIONS
(ON LAW REVIEW, LEGAL EDUCATION,
LAW PRACTICE, AND MY ALMA MATER)
Harry T. Edwards*
It is an honor for me to offer some reflections in commemoration
of the 100th anniversary of the Michigan Law Review. I have many
fond memories of my time at the University of Michigan Law School,
both as a law student and a member of the faculty. I was therefore
pleased to accept the assignment to present the keynote address at the
Centennial Celebration banquet.
It is hard for me to believe that it has been almost 40 years since I
was invited to serve on the Michigan Law Review. I remember it like it
was yesterday, for it was a very exciting moment for me. In those days,
an invitation to try out for the Law Review was based solely on grades
- if you were in the top 10% of the class at the end of your first year,
you received an invitation. In my year, I think the grade-point cutoff
for Review was about 3.2 or 3.3. We had no A+, A-, or B+ grades then
- the top of the grade range was A, B, and C+ - so a 3.3 was a ster
ling GPA. A's were hard to come by in those days.
An "invitation" from the Law Review did not guarantee election.
Rather, those of us who received an invitation were required to write
Notes or Comments during our second year, after which we faced an
election. And, not everyone who accepted an invitation to try out was
ultimately elected to serve on the Review. In fact, our names did not
appear on the Law Review masthead until the end of our second year
of law school, after we were elected to serve.
When I was a would-be editor of the Review, I wrote two notes,
both of which were published in April 1964. One note dealt with the
authority of the Federal Power Commission to limit the rate of return
on tax reserves resulting from the use of liberalized depreciation.1 I
am sure that I found nothing enjoyable in this project, for, even to
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this day, I do not relish analyzing cases from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (the successor agency to the FPC). My sec
ond note discussed whether section 43(a) of the Lanham Act created a
federal right of action against particular kinds of unfair competition in
interstate commerce.2
I would like to say that my first publications were seminal contri
butions to legal literature, resulting in profound changes in the law.
Such a claim would be quite fanciful, however. But I can safely say
that the opportunity to engage in serious legal research did have a pro
found affect on me.
I have never thought that election to the Law Review significantly
distinguished me from my classmates at the University of Michigan
Law School, for there were scores of very talented people in my class.
Service on the Law Review was very special for me, however, because
it forced me to be rigorous in my legal research; instilled discipline in
my writing; fine-tuned my analogical reasoning; prompted a healthy
sense of skepticism in my analysis of legal problems; made me confi
dentin my work; and fostered a love of the law and the legal profes
sion that I have never lost.
I also gained some lifelong friends during my time on the Law
Review. In fact, when I recently looked back at the Law Review mast
head for 1964-65, I was struck that I remembered almost everyone
listed. The members of the Review were a relatively close-knit group
- we challenged, inspired, and supported one another in ways that
were mutually beneficial, and in ways that I think served us well in the
years after graduation.
I have no idea whether law reviews of today instill the same sense
of comradery and foster the same levels of learning that I experienced
40 years ago. I hope so, for it can be an incalculably great legacy for
those who participate in the enterprise.

I am often asked what I think about the work of law reviews,
beyond their mission in training law students. That remains a difficult
question for me. I have always had misgivings about student editors
evaluating and editing the work of professors, for, normally, students
do not have the training, experience, or wisdom to make judgments on
scholarly work that I think should be subject to peer review. I do not
want to overstate the problem, however. There are a good many law
review editors who are quite able in their work. And there are also
more than a few law professors who have relied on law review editors
to complete their unfinished articles.

2. Harry T. Edwards, Recent Decisions, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1094 (1964).
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The most serious concern that I have with legal scholarship is that
too much of it is useless. Professor Robert Gordon of the Yale Law
School has written that

[t] he legal-academic machine is undoubtedly cranking out a good deal of
useless blather: articles that seem to have hardly anything to do with ad
dressing or understanding any legal problem, articles clotted with her
metic jargon or puffed up with self-indulgent posturing, articles clumsily
practicing intellectual modes that people in other fields execute with
much more grace and precision, articles borrowing intellectual fashions
that would be better off never having been invented.3
I agree. But this is not the fault of the law reviews, for the law reviews
merely reflect some disturbing trends in legal education.
Recently, I participated in a conference entitled "Norms and the
Law,'' celebrating the opening of the Center for Interdisciplinary
Studies at the Washington University School of Law.4 There were a
number of brilliant scholars from a variety of disciplines in attendance,
including social scientists, political scientists, economists, and lawyers.
And the array of conference topics included matters such as "eco
nomics of the household," "how norms overcome the tragedy of the
commons,'' "damages, norms and punishment,'' "judging and ascrip
tive group identity," and "other-regarding preferences and social
norms." What struck me most was the difficulty that people from dif
ferent disciplines had in communicating with one another. One prob
lem was that experts from one discipline sometimes did not under
stand or accept the research methodologies employed by experts from
another discipline. Another problem was that persons from one field
sometimes could not translate the "foreign" language of another disci
pline into concepts that made sense to them. The worst problem, at
least from my perspective, was the level of generality of the discus
sions. Abstractions abounded in the discussions, probably because it
made it easier for those from different disciplines to communicate.
The result, however, was that most of the conversations were devoid
of prescriptions. Even when social problems were identified, very little
was said about how to address them. The conversations were the stuff
of graduate schools, not law schools.
I think what I saw at Washington University is a reflection of the
present struggle in law schools throughout the country. We nobly em
brace the idea of interdisciplinary legal studies, but we do not as yet
know how to incorporate the idea without undermining what is good

3. Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 MICH. L. REV.
2075, 2076-77 (1993); see also Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 CHI. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2002) ("[T]he current state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply flawed") (em
phasis in original).
4. Norms and the Law, a conference celebrating the opening of the Center for Interdis
ciplinary Studies at the Washington University School of Law, Mar. 30-31, 2001, St. Louis,
Mo.
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about traditional legal education. Often we do not know how to assess
the work of other disciplines, so we do not know how to credit these
materials. As a consequence, we sometimes simply adopt a "graduate
school" approach in addressing interdisciplinary legal studies, probing
matters from other disciplines merely because they are interesting and
provocative in their own right. What we too often fail to do, however,
is draw on substantive materials from other disciplines to give content

to law and justice, which, of course, is the mission of legal education.
So it is not a surprise that at a recent conference on legal education
sponsored by the Yale Law School, one of the principal issues raised
by the conference planners was whether the incorporation of interdis
ciplinary legal studies is "necessarily a hodge-podge of methods and
perspectives, drawn from mutually opaque intellectual cultures."5
Why the "hodge-podge?" I used to think that there were not
enough people in legal education who knew enough about interdisci
plinary studies to make a difference, and that those who were present
were much better in law than in their other discipline. I think this is
less of an issue today, both because there are now a number of good
JD/PhDs on law faculties and also because more law professors now
know more about other disciplines. The problem, however, is that too
many legal scholars and teachers continue to discuss material from
non-law disciplines as if it has nothing in particular to do with legal
content. I still hear some law professors who do work in non-law areas
speak disdainfully of applying their work in legal contexts. Legal doc
trine is dismissed as trite. And abstractions are favored over prescrip
tions. It makes little sense to me.
To pursue the mission of legal education, we need to ask questions
like: How do we draft, administer, fund, and enforce laws that serve
the legitimate ends of a democratic society? How do we create systems
of justice to ensure equality and fairness for all who are affected by
laws? How do we integrate the laws of different states, federal and
state laws, and the laws of different nations? How do we regulate
those who practice law? These are large questions that legal doctrine
by itself cannot answer. Legal education therefore necessarily includes
an element of interdisciplinary studies, because lawyers need to test
the premises underlying legal rules.
For example, members of the legal profession concerned in any
way with criminal law must understand the science of DNA evidence.
And members of the legal profession involved with administrative
regulation need to understand the economics of regulation. There are
numerous other examples that I could cite. But the important point is
not that legal scholars should know some science or economics, but,

5. Yale Law School Tercentennial Conference, Dissolving Boundaries: Law, Law Jobs
and the Role of Law Schools in the New Century, Apr. 27-29, 2001, New Haven, Conn.
(memorandum detailing proposed list of panels and themes).
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rather, that they should know how to apply it to enhance the work of
our profession. DNA is important not because it is merely an inter
esting scientific phenomenon; it is important because it may affect de
terminations of guilt and innocence in our criminal justice system.
Lawyers need to know the limits of the science in order to be able to
craft legal principles that take full advantage of what the science
offers. Justice is then better served.
In no event, however, should we abandon the structural center of
legal education in favor of other things. Instead, legal educators and
scholars should use the broad vision of their mission to strengthen the
relationship between law and other disciplines. If I were to use an ar
chitectural metaphor, I would say that law and the achievement of jus
tice is the structural center and the other fields are the buttresses to it.
Both the center and the buttresses have to be present, playing their
distinct roles. The buttresses are crucial in assisting us in our central
mission. They do not become the mission itself.
It makes no sense to talk about legal materials without reference to
our goals for society, which entail extralegal forms of knowledge and
inquiry. However, legal scholars and educators have a unique obliga
tion to employ some pragmatism when engaging with other disci
plines.
Legal education and scholarship are unique in another way. Schol
ars in other disciplines often do not have an obligation to be both de
scriptive and normative. For example, scholars of literature could be
normative and ask, what is the best way to write, but they need not be
- it is enough if literary criticism shows us how texts work. Historians
could give us lessons for the future, but they need not - it is enough if
history describes how the past unfolded in a way that sheds light on it.
Legal scholars and educators, on the other hand, must be both descrip
tive and normative to pursue law and justice. We have an obligation
not just to clarify legal issues but to help solve them and produce the
best and most just answers to concrete problems.
It is deeply ironic that our commitment to global justice often
makes us the envy of the rest of the academy. We aim to make things
happen in the world. Academics from the social sciences and humani
ties sometimes envy us for our connection to the things that shape
human affairs. So think of how silly we seem if we insist on doing what
they do, often in an amateurish way. We should value our uniqueness
and the responsibility it confers on us.

In June of 2000, I moderated a panel on legal education in the 21st
century. One of the panelists, Dean Robert Clark, from Harvard Law
School, argued that,

[i]n the last 35 years, the most important development [that we have
seen] has been the sheer growth and differentiation of legal education

2004

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 100:1999

which reflects a similar pattern of development in the legal profes
sion.... [T]he claim of the legal system on the economy and polity, both
absolutely and in percentage terms, has gone up.The same can be said of
the legal profession.It is much bigger .... And many more areas of life,
economic and social, are covered by law.
The academy has responded to this - not necessarily consciously,
quickly, or certainly not optimally - but it has responded .... [T]here
are many more law schools, many more law students, many more profes
sors, and a vastly bigger curriculum that covers more subjects. As a result
of this growth, there has been differentiation .... Now we have scholars
who are high theorists, who are purely historians of law, and law and
economics people. We also have many more interdisciplinary special
ists[,] ... [clinical law teachers, and experts in international law] ....
[T]his parallels developments in legal practice. It's a massive phenomenon, and it's quite natural - not necessarily good though.6
In my view, Dean Clark is quite right when he says that many of the
developments in legal education have not been pursued "consciously,
quickly, or optimally," and that many of these developments have not
necessarily been good.
For example, it is true that there are many more courses now being
taught in law school. I would maintain, however, that the expanded
curriculum in law schools has led to some incoherence in legal educa
tion. John Sexton, formerly the Dean of the NYU Law School, has ar
gued that a major problem with legal education is that at least two
thirds of law student course work is not guided by content - students
study what they want in the second and third years of law school, often
with no good pedagogical reasons for their course selections.7 He has
proposed that law students should have a "distribution requirement"
in their course work, to ensure that they are exposed to a spectrum of
major manifestations of law - common law, statutory law, constitu
tional law, and procedure - in both the first year and in their upper
class courses.8
Unfortunately, there is little pressure on the law schools to adopt
significant, educational reforms. The major law firms seem not to care
much about law school curriculum requirements, presumably because
so much practice is now specialized and many practitioners believe
that young associates can gain specialized training on the job. And, of

6. Robert C. Clark, Remarks at the 2000 Judicial Conference, United States Courts for
the District of Columbia Circuit, Williamsburg, Va., Panel Discussion: Legal Education in
the 21st Century, 2-3 (Jun. 15, 2000), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/
jconf/Legal_Edu_All.pdf.
7. John Sexton, Out of the Box -Thinking About the Training of Lawyers in the Next
Millennium, Address to the American Bar Association (Aug. 2000), in NYU LAW SCHOOL
MAG., Autumn 2000, at 34, 36.

8. Id. at 39. I would add international law to this list.
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course, law professors (myself included) have no real incentive to
abandon an academic tradition that affords them great freedom in de
ciding what to teach.
The simple truth is that there is no coherent bridge between legal
education and the practice of law.9 The January 2002 edition of the
ABA Journal documents the fact that "the practice of law has been
rocked by more than a decade of upheaval,"10 causing some futurists
to suggest that "we could be on the verge of seeing the disappearance
of the practice of law as a distinctive profession in American life."11 In
such a setting, it is easy to understand why some legal academics have
moved more toward a "graduate school" model of education.
In any event, it is a fact of life now that legal education often does
not give law students a good picture of law practice. And it is well
known that modern law firm practice has disenchanted many young
lawyers. They see it as a big money enterprise - resulting in unrea
sonable hours, tedious work, and sometimes questionable ethical deci
sions. Large numbers of graduates still seek employment in the major
firms, for the money is good and it helps to pay off school debts. But a
number of young lawyers leave big-firm practice after only a short
stay. Often, some of the brightest young lawyers seek to move from
practice to the teaching of law as quickly as possible, with little practi
cal knowledge or professional experience. And in recent years, a
number of law schools have adopted policies of hiring only those can
didates who have published major articles before beginning the appli
cation process, thus favoring persons who have earned PhDs and ex
cluding bright young lawyers with significant practice experience. This
exacerbates the distressing disconnection between legal education and
legal practice.
Nonetheless, I am not a naysayer. Indeed, I am optimistic about
the future of legal education. There has been a healthy debate within
the academy over the past decade, and many law schools have made
real strides in addressing some of the issues that we now face in legal
education. I do not think the transformation of legal education is
complete, but I think we are at least on the right path.
9. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Harry T. Edwards. The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 2191 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, Another "Postscript" to "The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession," 69 WASH. L. REV. 561 (1994); Harry T.
Edwards, A New Vision for the Legal Profession, 72 N. Y.U. L. REV. 567 (1997); MARY ANN

GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE
BETRAYEO PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THETWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
10.

Looking Forward, Looking Back, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2002,

11. Terry Carter,
law professor, Robert

Law at the Crossroads, A.B.A.

W. Gordon).

at cover page.

J., Jan. 2002, at 29, 34 (quoting Yale

2006

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1999

Before I conclude my reflections, I want to say again how pleased I
was to be invited to participate in the Law Review's Centennial
Celebration. My allegiance to Michigan is as strong now as it was
when I graduated in 1965. I love the law school, second to none. My
time at Michigan, both as a student and as a law professor, enriched
my professional life immeasurably and gave me many loyal and cher
ished friends.
When I was preparing these reflections, I thought a lot about the
intangible rewards that I have enjoyed by virtue of my association with
the University of Michigan Law School. Three things immediately
came to mind. First, my education at the University of Michigan Law
School gave me real confidence in my abilities. I was taught by my
mentors - especially Professors Russell Smith, Roger Cramton, and
Frank Allen - to aim high, determine the full reach of my ability, and
then do what had to be done. No whining . . . just do it - whether it
be teaching a class, trying a case, writing an article, giving a speech, or
serving as a judge. My mentors were venturesome, demanding, and
sometimes impatient, but very disciplined. They were fearless in their
work and intolerant of poor performance. They were sterling role
models, and I have strived hard to follow their leads. They gave me
the confidence to achieve when I left law school.
Second, my time at Michigan, both as a student and a professor,
taught me the value of collegiality. I was nurtured and inspired by my
student classmates and my teaching colleagues. We learned lessons to
gether and shared ideas. And we enjoyed one another.
I remember talking with a professor from another preeminent law
school a number of years ago, just after he had finished teaching as a
visitor at Michigan. He was literally bubbling over with enthusiasm,
telling me how wonderful it had been to share time and ideas with
members of the Michigan faculty. This professor believed, as do I, that
professional collegiality invariably enhances performance, because it
allows people to trade ideas without acrimony, which in turn helps to
advance learning.
A similar sort of collegiality among my judicial colleagues was one
of my main goals during my term as Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit. I
worked hard to encourage it. My colleagues were happy to embrace it.
And we all agree that the court is a better place in which to work be
cause of it. I have Michigan to thank for instilling in me some impor
tant ideas about the worth of collegiality.
Finally, my time at Michigan Law School made me very skeptical
of ideological labels, such as "conservative" or "liberal;" and it has
caused me to reject the now fashionable view that the answer to every
question must be assessed in ideological terms. A number of my
classmates at Michigan held political views that were more conserva-
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tive than mine, but they were nonetheless brilliant, thoughtful, inter
esting, challenging, and supportive. We shared ideas, to our mutual
advantage, often finding common-ground solutions to seemingly
insurmountable problems.
I found the same to be true of most of my faculty colleagues at
Michigan. My mentor, Russell Smith, had some political views that I
did not share. That did not deter him from doing everything in his
power to advance my professional career, including ensuring the pub
lication of my first case book. Professor J. J. White and I were never
ideological compatriots, yet neither he nor I hesitated for a second
when we decided to collaborate in teaching the negotiation course and
in co-authoring a book on negotiations.12 There are many other exam
ples that I could cite.
I have no doubt that what I experienced at Michigan has had a
profound effect on my work as a judge. I reject the view that judges
are largely lawless in their decisionmaking, influenced more by per
sonal ideology than legal principles. I believe that principled decision
making is not a foolish idea. In my view, it is the worst indictment for
judges to be labeled political partisans and to be seen as result
oriented in their decision making. The strength of my conviction is at
tributable in no small measure to my time at the Michigan Law
School.

The Centennial Celebration of the Michigan Law Review is a
fitting tribute to an extraordinary journal, one that has served the
academy and the legal community with consistent high quality and
great distinction for all these years. I am proud to be part of this his
tory. I am not sure that any "keynote" address can do justice to the
glorious traditions of the Michigan Law Review and the University of
Michigan Law School, but I am deeply honored to have been invited
to undertake the assignment.

12.

HARRYT. EDWARDS & JAMESJ. WHITE, THE LAWYER ASA NEGOTIATOR (1977).

